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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

8 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 49)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 NOVEMBER - 5 DECEMBER 1971

Moscow (2961 items)

European Security	(2%)	7%
[Warsaw Pact	(0.1%)	3%]
Foreign Ministers		
Conference		
Kosygin in Denmark	(--)	7%
China	(3%)	6%
CPSU Central Committee	(13%)	5%
Plenum		
USSR Constitution Day	(--)	5%
Supreme Soviet Session	(21%)	4%
Yugoslav National Day	(1%)	3%
UK-Rhodesian Agreement	(1%)	3%
Indian-Pakistani Conflict	(1%)	3%
Indochina	(4%)	3%

Peking (1594 items)

Domestic Issues	(13%)	27%
[Joint Editorial	(--)	3%]
on Leadership		
Indian-Pakistani	(3%)	17%
Conflict		
Albanian National Day	(3%)	12%
Indochina	(40%)	11%
[Pham Van Dong in	(32%)	4%]
PRC		
[Cambodia	(4%)	4%]
UN Disarmament Debate	(3%)	6%
Middle East	(0.2%)	5%
Peruvian Foreign Trade	(1%)	3%
Delegation in PRC		
Yugoslav National Day	(1%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term 'commentary' is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDIA - PAKISTAN

MOSCOW DEFINES SECURITY INTEREST; PEKING DECRIES "BLACKMAIL"

Deepening expressions of support by Moscow and Peking for their respective friends in the Indian-Pakistani conflict have been overlaid by polemical exchanges between the two communist powers that mark South Asia as a major arena of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. A TASS statement on 5 December, the most authoritative Soviet policy statement since the intensification of hostilities on the 3d, defined a Soviet security interest in the conflict and implicitly warned the Chinese against deeper involvement. A vitriolic Chinese retort in the form of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 7th, the second of three successive commentaries on this level, charged that the TASS statement "smacks of gunpowder" and represents "barefaced blackmail and intimidation." Pointing to questions of power politics involved in the conflict, Commentator claimed that the Soviets are seeking to take advantage of the situation to expand their influence in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.

The divergence between the positions taken by Moscow and Peking has broadened as the two sides have taken firmer stands on the East Pakistan separatist movement. Though Moscow has not as yet followed New Delhi's lead in recognizing the Bangla Desh government, the Soviets have conferred a measure of legitimacy on the separatists by saying they are leading a "national liberation movement." Peking, on the other hand, has flatly dismissed the Bangla Desh regime as a "puppet" set up by India to realize its aim to "annex" East Pakistan. The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 8th, devoted to India's recognition of the Bangla Desh government two days earlier, ridiculed the Bengali separatists as a "small handful of Pakistan national outcasts."

While Moscow and Peking have thus dug in deeper in supporting their friends, both sides continue to show caution regarding the broader security implications of the conflict. Moscow, unlike New Delhi, has not cited the Soviet-Indian treaty and has not gone beyond the TASS statement in specifying the USSR's stake in the developments. While Peking has made repeated references to the treaty, depicting it as an instrument of Soviet expansion in the region and an encouragement of Indian aggression, the Chinese have avoided portraying a threat to

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their security interests and passed over the warning conveyed in the TASS statement. Chinese pledges of support for Pakistan against aggression have been formulated in the same terms and on the same level as before the recent intensification of hostilities.

TASS CITES PAKISTANI REPRESSION, SOVIET SECURITY INTEREST

The TASS statement of 5 December enunciated in familiar terms the Soviet position on the Indian-Pakistani crisis, outlined the evolution of that crisis, and called for a rapid cessation of hostilities, a political settlement in East Pakistan, and restraint by all other countries. Contending that "the main cause" of Indian-Pakistani tensions was "the situation created in East Pakistan as a result of the Pakistan Government's actions against the population of that part of the country," the statement noted that the Soviet Government had "repeatedly expressed" its concern over the situation to Pakistani President Yahya Khan and had called for "the renunciation of the policy of repressions, the release of [Awami League Leader Mujibur] Rahman, and the immediate resumption of talks with the aim of finding such a solution that would accord with the will expressed by the population of East Pakistan at the elections in December 1970." Since the Pakistani Government did not take measures for a political settlement and continued its military buildup against India, the statement continued, "the Soviet leaders informed President Yahya Khan that Pakistan's armed attack against India, under whatever pretext, would evoke the most resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union."

Raising the issue of a threat to Soviet security, TASS declared that "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the developments, considering also the circumstances that they are taking place in direct proximity of the USSR's borders and, therefore, involve the interests of its security." The Soviet Government, TASS said, "finds it necessary to state to the Pakistan leaders with all clarity about the grave responsibility that they assume following this dangerous course." The statement called for "the speediest ending of the bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people."

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The statement concluded with a warning against outside involvement in the conflict. The Soviet Government, according to TASS, urges "the governments of all countries" to "refrain from steps signifying in this way or that way their involvement in the conflict and leading to a further aggravation of the situation in the Hindustan peninsula."

The TASS statement stands as the most authoritative exposition of Soviet policy on the intensified conflict. On 8 December, in fact, TASS disseminated the statement again without explanation. Soviet concern has also been expressed in briefer terms by the Soviet leadership troika. CPSU chief Brezhnev, speaking at the Polish party congress on the 7th, called for cessation of the bloodshed and a peaceful political settlement, taking particular note of "the events which engendered this conflict: the bloody suppression of the basic rights and clearly expressed will of the population of East Pakistan, and the tragedy of 10 million refugees." President Podgorny made similar remarks in speeches on the 7th and 8th.

Premier Kosygin, speaking in Denmark on 4 December, expressed "great concern" over the emergence of "a dangerous seat of conflict" between India and Pakistan and called for liquidation of the conflict. He placed the onus directly on Pakistan, observing that "it is necessary above all to overcome a dangerous domestic policy crisis that formed in East Pakistan as a result of wholesale reprisals" by the Pakistani authorities. Kosygin declared that "the will of the people of East Pakistan expressed in the December 1970 elections" must be implemented and security guaranteed for the return of the refugees.

Relatively limited Soviet comment has been keyed largely to the TASS statement. Thus, the commentators on the Moscow domestic service observers' roundtable on the 5th and a PRAVDA commentary on the 6th said the crisis resulted from "the armed repressions" against the East Pakistanis as a reprisal for their election of Mujibur's Awami League and its advocacy of autonomy for East Pakistan. They also highlighted Pakistan's "military action on a very wide scale" and took particular note of past warnings to Pakistan cited in the TASS statement as well as the statement's reference to a Soviet security interest.

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SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY The TASS statement did not mention the Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation signed in August, and Soviet media have all but ignored the treaty in current comment. Indian media on 4 December reported that Article 9 of the treaty had been invoked; it provides that in case either party "is attacked or threatened with attack," the two countries will "immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to insure peace and security for their countries." A report carried by Delhi radio on the 6th--but not monitored in Soviet media--said that the Indian ambassador had met that day with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to "review the latest developments in the Indian subcontinent and the debate in the Security Council on the subject." A rare Soviet reference to the treaty appeared in a TASS report on the 7th replying to the Chinese contention that the pact encouraged Indian aggression.

REBUTTAL OF CHINESE Neither the TASS statement nor the Soviet leaders' remarks mentioned the Chinese position in the crisis, but Moscow has been driven into polemical jousting with the Chinese by their drumbeat of attacks and the exchanges taking place in the United Nations. Previously the anti-Chinese polemics were concentrated in broadcasts to China over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, but by 7 December Moscow felt obliged to respond to Peking's production of "one anti-Soviet statement after another."

A TASS report on that date rebuked the Chinese for "totally ignoring the unanimous support given by the East Pakistan population to the Awami League at the elections in December 1970" and accused them of "whitewashing mass repressions and terror by the Pakistan authorities against the population of the eastern part of the country." Noting that Chinese media "portray the genuine representatives of the East Pakistan population as 'Pakistani splitters,'" TASS cited PRC opposition to hearing "representatives of the East Pakistan population" at Security Council meetings. TASS concluded that Peking's propaganda "is added proof that the Chinese leadership couldn't care less about the destinies of the national liberation movement and the interests of anti-imperialist struggle."

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Driving home the point, TASS less than an hour later reported a statement by "the foreign minister of Bangla Desh" in which "he denounced the 'exceedingly threatening role of the two superpowers, the United States and the PRC,' in discussing the Indo-Pakistani conflict in the Security Council."

For several days prior to the TASS attack of the 7th, Peace and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin had vigorously condemned the Chinese role in the subcontinent. Countering Peking's increasing attacks on the role of the Soviet-Indian treaty as an encouragement of Indian aggression, the commentaries portrayed Peking as an instigator of Pakistani extremists and reactionaries in the heightening of tensions and stressed the Soviet themes that the basic issue is repression in East Pakistan of a genuine "national liberation struggle." The commentaries have also stressed that the Soviet position has been one of encouraging a peaceful political settlement of the problem.

A commentator on 6 December asserted that the Chinese leaders sought "the expansion of military action so as to drag new countries into the conflict" and said the Chinese "try to provoke regional wars anywhere in the world." Referring to the possibility of the expansion of a regional war into a large-scale nuclear war, which would "annihilate the peoples of all countries, including the Chinese people," the commentary took note of Mao Tse-tung's "unabashed statement" that "the death of hundreds of millions of the Chinese people in a nuclear war would be a healthy blood transfusion."

PEKING PORTRAYS SOVIET ROLE AS MAIN CAUSE OF TENSION

The 5 December TASS statement acted as a catalyst which has turned Peking's comment on the Indian-Pakistani conflict into a withering anti-Soviet campaign. While Peking previously had been using the circumlocution "social imperialism" in referring to the Soviets and had directed the main thrust of its attack against India, the 7 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the TASS statement accused "Soviet revisionist social imperialism" of being the main source of the tension in the subcontinent. Peking has launched a massive propaganda campaign devoted to the South Asian conflict, accounting for some four-fifths of Radio Peking's output during the first half of the week beginning on the 5th.

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The 7 December Commentator article, saying the TASS statement "smacks of gunpowder," took sharp exception to the statement's assertion "with ulterior motives" of a Soviet security interest in the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Recalling the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and noting that the statement cited the proximity of the USSR's borders to the region of current tension, Commentator asked the Soviets if they are "going to take action." The TASS statement represents "barefaced blackmail and intimidation," according to Commentator.

Pursuing a theme developed in the Commentator article on the 6th, the article on the 7th claimed that one of the main aims of the Soviet-Indian treaty is to support India in "annexing" East Pakistan and to gain further control over India in order to expand Soviet influence in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. But while Peking has thus expressed concern over the Soviet role in the region, Chinese pronouncements have not defined a threat to the PRC's own security interests or taken direct note of the TASS statement's warning against outside involvement.

CHINESE LEADERS At a 4 December reception given by the Mauritanian ambassador, Acting PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, the only Chinese leader to have discussed the Indian-Pakistani conflict since the intensification of hostilities on the 3d, charged that the Indian Government, "supported and encouraged by social imperialism," had continued "to expand its armed aggression against Pakistan." Noting that "an Indian leader"--he did not name Indian Premier Indira Gandhi--had made "the truculent demand for Pakistan troops to withdraw from East Pakistan," Chi termed this "a brazen demand" which "completely revealed India's expansionist ambitions." Chi declared: "We strongly condemn India for its subversion and aggression and reaffirm that the Chinese Government and people firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose foreign aggression."

Chi's comments on the Indian-Pakistan crisis were excerpted by NCNA and carried some four hours prior to NCNA's report on the Mauritanian ambassador's reception. Chi made no reference to any implications for Chinese security. He did not elaborate on the existing Chinese commitment--as enunciated by Chi himself on 7 November during Ali Bhutto's visit to the PRC--that "should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistani Government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence."

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Chou En-lai, in the undated interview with author Neville Maxwell which appeared in the London SUNDAY TIMES on 5 December, noted that Chi on 7 November had "already stated our principles" on the Indian-Pakistani issue, adding: "We firmly support Pakistan against India's subversive and aggressive activities." Contending that the draft of the Soviet-Indian treaty "had lain for two years in a drawer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union," Chou asserted that "after the announcement of Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Union hastily concluded this treaty with India," a treaty designed "to realize Brezhnev's 'Asian collective security system,' which is directed against the countries to which Russia is hostile." Chou did not comment on Maxwell's statement that "there is a genuine Bengali nationalist movement in East Pakistan." Peking media did not carry the interview.

BANGLA DESH In the series of PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles the Chinese have taken a tough stand against the Bengali separatists, overcoming an earlier reluctance to discuss the independence movement. Commentator accused India of trying "to inject" the Bangla Desh "puppet regime" into Pakistan through "open, direct invasion by Indian troops, so as to achieve its long-planned aim to annex East Pakistan." Commentator likened the East Pakistani refugee issue to the Tibetan refugee question more than a decade ago and described "the 'Bangla Desh' of today" as "simply a reproduction of the 'Manchukuo' of the past."

Consistent with Peking's line over the months, Commentator ignored the details of the events in East Pakistan precipitating the crisis and reiterated the position that internal affairs "should be settled by the people of the country themselves" and disputes between countries "should be settled through consultations by the countries concerned." Asserting that the Chinese government and people "are closely following the developments of the situation in the sub-continent," Commentator called the Pakistani struggle "a just one" and said "the Chinese people resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity and to counter foreign aggression."

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SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS MARK SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

The UN Security Council deliberations on the conflict have provided a forum for Sino-Soviet skirmishing, with the Chinese being especially vitriolic in pressing the attack. Joining issue with the Soviets on the question of inviting a Bangla Desh representative to the Security Council session, PRC delegate Huang Hua contended that to do so would be "tantamount to asking the Security Council to interfere directly in the internal affairs of Pakistan" and that the Soviet proposal was simply an obstructionist and delaying tactic. Huang called the Bangla Desh Government a "neo-Quisling government, a neo-Manchukuo government," and suggested that following India's recognition of it the Soviet Government "probably" will also "declare its recognition of that 'government' tomorrow or the day after tomorrow." Huang concluded his statement to the Security Council on the 6th with this statement: "I wish only to address a few words of good intention to Mr. Malik: Please bear in mind the fate of 'Manchukuo' Quislings and their behind-the-scenes boss!"

Huong's speech at the 5 December Security Council session was particularly vehement toward the Soviets. Charging Moscow with "connivance, support, and shielding" of India's armed aggression with the objective "of gaining control over the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and enlarging its sphere of influence in its contention with the other superpower for hegemony," Huang touched on such subjects as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion" engineered by the Soviet Union in 1962 in Sinkiang and the subsequent forcible detention of "several tens of thousands" of Chinese civilians by the Soviet Union; the "so-called Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation which is in fact a treaty of military alliance;" the 1968 Czechoslovakian "occupation;" and the Soviet Government's "plot to subvert the legal government of an African country this year."

Soviet reportage on the Security Council discussions has highlighted the Soviet proposal to invite "the representatives of the national liberation movement of East Pakistan (Bangla Desh)" to the sessions, charged the United States and China with obstructionist tactics, and pressed the Soviet contention that UN action must deal with "the fundamental cause" of the crisis, which is "the situation created in East Pakistan as a result of terrorizing the population of East Pakistan by the Pakistani authorities."

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A TASS account on the 6th, which cited the Chinese veto of the Soviet resolution "for a political settlement in East Pakistan that would inevitably result in cessation of hostilities," took note of the Sino-Soviet polemics enlivening the Security Council debate. TASS pointed out that the Chinese representative "used his speech for slandering the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the policy of India" and for launching attacks on "the national liberation movement of East Pakistan." Moscow had not until the past few days referred to the separatist movement in East Bengal as a "national liberation movement."

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COMMUNISTS ASSESS CAMBODIAN "VICTORIES," ROLE OF BIG BATTLES

Communist media predictably praise the capture of Cambodian Government positions at the towns of Baray and Kompong Thmar--on Route 6, north of Phnom Penh. The official account of the action is presented in a communique of "the Route 6 front command" of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF), dated 2 December but first publicized on the 5th.

The communique claims that the "the CNPLAF and the people" have inflicted 12,000 casualties and captured thousands of troops in the fighting along Route 6 since the Phnom Penh government's operation Chenla 2 began on 20 August. It also maintains that five brigades and more than 30 battalions were "seriously mauled" and "huge amounts of war material" seized. In the final four days of fighting, according to the communique, more than 3,000 government troops were killed, wounded, or captured. It says that the commanders of the Chenla 2 operation "deserted their troops" and that "several other brigade and battalion commanders were either mauled or captured."

The communique acclaims the military achievements on Route 6 as "the biggest feat-of-arms" of the CNPLAF, but the battle is given greater significance in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a similar LPA commentary on the 6th. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, acclaiming the Route 6 engagements as "strategically important" and a "major campaign of annihilation," is at variance with a NHAN DAN editorial on the same day which limits its praise to references to the CNPLAF's "great victory" and "glorious exploit." The army paper seems quite deliberate in its effort to magnify the significance of the CNPLAF's achievement, noting that the Cambodian forces were able to launch "large-scale attacks involving concentrated forces," that they fought "big battles," and that "such major battles of annihilation are of very important significance" and have "substantially changed the balance of forces of both sides on the battlefield." The victories on Route 6, according to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, "reflect further improvement of the CNPLAF's ability to fight big battles involving massive forces."

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It is possible that the army paper merely has more license than NHAN DAN to analyze military matters. But it is also possible that QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's stress on the communists' ability to fight major engagements reflects an argument with more conservative forces represented in NHAN DAN's relatively reserved evaluation.

An earlier QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, on 4 December, commented on "strategic victories" this year to similarly make the point that the balance of forces had shifted favorably. It described the allied position as "unstable" in South Vietnam, "highly alarming" in Cambodia, and "very precarious" in Laos. Voicing what could be viewed as an argument for large-scale attacks, the editorial stated that "in the process of war, a period of slow development must be followed by a phase of outstanding progress." It went on, however, to state that the armed forces and people "must be determined to undergo a protracted war." An article earlier this year, published in the January-February issue of TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), had been much more direct in maintaining that protracted warfare "is not protracted guerrilla fighting" and that there must also be "sudden leap-like developments."*

Suggesting at another point that it anticipated large-scale fighting, the 4 December editorial urged: "It is necessary to constantly heighten the quality of the people's armed forces in all fields and to improve their tactical skills so they can stage effective, large-scale combined attacks against the enemy." The editorial warned that there would be further "difficulties and hardships" and, among other things, specifically cautioned that "it is possible that the enemy will embark on new military adventures against the North in an attempt to intimidate our northern armed forces and people and to prevent the vast rearbase from bringing assistance to the great frontline."

DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. BOMBING; PRESS EXHORTS AIR FORCE

The most recent in Hanoi's continuing series of foreign ministry spokesman's protests, issued on 6 December, condemns U.S. raids against the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Quang Binh Province

* Other Vietnamese communist propaganda on the issue of the role of large-scale combat was discussed in the TRENDS of 20 October 1971, pages 7-9, and 4 August 1971, pages 15-17.

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from 22 November to 5 December. (Spokesman protests of 8, 13, 20 and 22 November had protested U.S. action against various areas of North Vietnam from 7 to 21 November.) The current protest charges that U.S. planes including B-52's conducted "daily ferocious air raids" on Huong Lap village in the DMZ, and that during the same period U.S. planes hit localities in Quang Binh Province "causing losses in lives and property."

Routinely condemning these "acts of war" and demanding that the United States end all acts "infringing upon DRV sovereignty and security," the spokesman "flatly rejected the 'protective response' argument so often repeated by the U.S. Administration to plead for its piratic acts." (DRV media, of course, have not mentioned recent U.S. press stories and statements by U.S. spokesmen on DRV air activity over Laos or the acknowledgment that air strikes on 8 November, initially described by U.S. spokesmen as falling in the protective reaction category, were aimed at an unoccupied North Vietnamese air field.*)

Recent U.S. statements on increased DRV air defense over Laos and North Vietnam this winter come in the wake of notable Hanoi propaganda on tasks of antiaircraft troops and the air force. A 20 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial--just available in full translation from the press--urged both the antiaircraft troops and the air force to be vigilant and "annihilate the enemy when he comes." It is more usual for Hanoi media to discuss vigilance and combat readiness in terms of the requirements of the local forces--the militia and self-defense troops. However, the major propaganda campaign calling for vigilance and combat readiness last fall following the 21 November 1970 massive U.S. air strikes and the prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay did, of course, stress antiaircraft and air force tasks.

Hanoi radio on 20 November had broadcast a brief version of the editorial in the army paper, but that version emphasized the threat of "new U.S. military adventures" and only broadly

* The strikes on 7-8 November prompted the usual foreign ministry spokesman's statement, rather than the higher level foreign ministry statement, but the spokesman did, however, call the strikes "particularly serious." Moreover, atypically there was supporting press comment. See the TRENDS of 10 November 1971, pages 17-19.

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discussed vigilance.* The full text of the editorial, however, notes that the antiaircraft troops and the air force are "the core force to annihilate the enemy, to destroy all enemy air strikes and to insure safety for our forces, positions, and routes." The primary task to successfully fulfill combat readiness, says the editorial, is to "constantly train ourselves to heighten vigilance and fighting spirit, any time, any place--whether close to the demarcation line and border or far behind the front, whether there are enemy aircraft or not--we must be ready."

The editorial says antiaircraft and air force units "must train intensively to heighten fighting abilities . . . assure that enemy aircraft are hit as soon as the antiaircraft units open fire and that outstanding exploits are scored once the aircraft take off." It warns that "conservative thinking and reluctance to make progress" must be overcome, and it urges that "the enemy's law of operation and combat tricks" be studied and that "good fighting methods" be invented. The editorial states that each antiaircraft and air force unit, "no matter when and where it is stationed and whether it is conducting an operation or on the battlefield, must have a combat plan to be ready to attack and annihilate the enemy."

PRG ANNOUNCES DETAILS OF HOLIDAY CEASE-FIRES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Following the pattern set in previous years, Liberation Radio on 3 December broadcast a PRG statement and an order from the PLAF Command on the suspension of military attacks on the occasion of the upcoming holidays.** The statement and the order, both dated the 3d, indicate that, like last year, the communists' cease-fires will last for three days at Christmas and over the New Year and for four days at the time of Tet (the lunar new year). Providing the details, the PLAF order stipulates that all attacks should be suspended for Christmas, from zero hour Indochina (Hanoi) time on 24 December to zero

* A flurry of comment warned of "new U.S. military adventures" at that time. See the 24 November TRENDS, pages 12-14.

** Similar PRG and PLAF cease-fire announcements were broadcast on 1 December 1970. For a discussion of that propaganda see the 2 December 1970 TRENDS, pages 12-13.

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hour on the 27th; for the New Year, from zero hour on 31 December to zero hour on 3 January; and for the Nham Ty Tet, from zero hour on 14 February to zero hour on 18 February.

Adhering closely to last year's PLAF order, the present one specifies that the allies will be allowed freedom to carry out holiday activities and to visit "liberated areas" during the truces, as long as they do not travel in groups or carry weapons or spy equipment. As in previous years, it warns that allied violations of the cease-fires will be "duly punished." The PRG statement and subsequent Front propaganda maintain that if the "obdurate, perfidious, and bellicose" Nixon Administration would seriously respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal the war would end and the allied forces could all go home to their families.

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 7th ridiculed recent "vague remarks" by President Thieu about holiday cease-fires, commenting that the latest ARVN incursion into Cambodia renders meaningless any call for a truce by Thieu. The radio does not specify that Thieu, in a 4 December speech before a class of graduating officers, reaffirmed that the Saigon government would as usual enact holiday cease-fires, adding that he would decide on the times of the truces.

PRG PUTS DRV ELABORATION OF SEVEN-POINT PLAN ON PARIS RECORD

DRV elaborations of the demands in the PRG's seven-point proposal--spelled out by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in his 20 November speech in Peking and in the PRC-DRV joint communique on the visit--were put on the record at the 2 December session of the Paris talks by PRG deputy delegation head Dinh Ba Thi.* Both the VNA and LPA accounts note that Thi specified that under point one on U.S. "cessation of aggression" and troop withdrawal the United States "must cease all military acts, including those of the air force and navy, against the people in both

* For a discussion, see the TRENDS of 24 November 1971, pages 5-8. Because of the Thanksgiving recess the 2 December session of the Paris talks is the first held since Dong's visit to China.

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zones of Vietnam."* And he explained that point two means that the United States "must renounce all support and commitments to the bellicose Nguyen Van Thieu clique" Both VNA and LPA also note that Thi repeated that the seven points form a "single entity."

DRV delegate Xuan Thuy referred only briefly to the seven points and did not spell out any of the substance. Moreover, VNA glosses over some of the remarks he did make. Thus, it reports him as saying that the seven-point plan "still offers the most correct basis" for peacefully settling the Vietnam problem--as opposed to the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization. But VNA ignores his further remarks that the PRG delegate "explained how points one and two are inseparable and the delegate of the DRV has also expressed his views."

VNA neglects to report that the PRG's Thi acknowledged some of the substance of the other five points of the 1 July proposal, saying that they offered "appropriate solutions" also to the questions of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam, peaceful reunification, relations between the two zones of Vietnam, South Vietnam's external policy of peace and neutrality and such "concrete problems" as cease-fire and the total release of military men of all parties. It has been more usual in recent months for the Paris delegates to mention the substance of only points one and two, if that. The VNA account notes, however, that Thi said if the United States does respond positively to the proposal "the war will be ended, peace will be restored, all U.S. military men including those captured will be able to return home soon in safety and a new relation will be established between the United States and South Vietnam."

* This closely parallels the formulation in the joint communique. Dong in his 20 November speech had demanded an end "to all military acts, in any form and from any place whatsoever, against the Vietnamese people in the two zones." Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in his 24 October speech during the DPRK delegation's visit to Hanoi had referred to an end to "all U.S. air and naval activities," and the joint DPRK-DRV communique had specified air and naval activities "in South Vietnam." Subsequent propaganda echoed the latter formulation, and it was voiced by PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien at the 4 November Paris session, but this was not reflected in the VNA account.

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VNA ignores much of Thi's lengthy documentation of his complaint that the United States has attempted to achieve a "military victory" through Vietnamization rather than respond to the PRG proposal. But the account reports that Xuan Thuy took issue with the President's statement--in his 12 November press conference announcing the withdrawal of 45,000 more troops in the next two months--that "Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form." Thuy scored U.S. involvement in Cambodia from the March 1970 anti-Sihanouk coup to the recent move of more ARVN troops into the country. Thuy also called contradictory the President's "repeated statements that he was furthering 'Vietnamization' while negotiating."

POW ISSUE The VNA account of the session totally ignores the substance of Ambassador Porter's remarks, in which, among other things, he again questioned the decreasing volume of mail from U.S. POW's in the DRV. VNA says only that the U.S. delegate "remained very stubborn and again resorted to odious provocative allegations."

The 7 December Liberation Radio commentary on implementation of the PRG's call for holiday cease-fires labeled as "hypocritical" both Thieu's remarks on a cease-fire and the "U.S. Paris delegate's plea" that POW's be allowed to send letters to their families. It asked whether the U.S. claim that it is concerned "about the U.S. troops' feelings regarding Christmas" has any meaning when it has "stubbornly rejected" the PRG's seven-point initiative.

The prisoner issue was also raised in a "current events" talk broadcast by Hanoi radio in Mandarin on 2 December. Pressing the standard line that the way to allow the prisoners to rejoin their families is to accept the PRG proposal, the broadcast deprecated the President's remark in his 12 November press conference that further U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam would depend, among other things, on progress in the problem of releasing U.S. prisoners of war. It suggested that the President sees the Christmas season as an opportunity to placate public opinion and pave the way for next year's elections.

PRC-DRV TRADE AGREEMENT, PROTOCOLS ON AID REPORTED

Further publicity for Chinese assistance to the DRV came with the signing on 5 December of a Sino-DRV trade agreement and protocols on the supply of materials. NCNA and VNA reported

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that an agreement on "mutual supply of goods and payments for 1972" and two protocols on China's supplying of "general goods" and "complete projects" in 1972 were signed. According to the reports, the protocols were in accordance with the 27 September Sino-DRV agreement on economic and military assistance. The signators were, as usual, PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Li Chiang and his DRV counterpart, Ly Ban. PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien attended the ceremony, as he did last year, and members of a DRV "experts delegation" were present. An "experts delegation," led by Ly Ban, had arrived in Peking on 28 August. Ly Ban had returned to Hanoi to participate in the talks during Li Hsien-nien's visit when the aid agreement was signed, and he was again present in Peking when the Pham Van Dong delegation visited from 20 to 27 November.

The signing of a trade agreement some time after the annual PRC-DRV aid agreement has been standard practice, but last year was the first time protocols on economic cooperation had also been publicized.* The accords last year, signed on 31 October, included four protocols. Three were concluded between the two governments, dealing with Chinese supply to the DRV of materials, aid in the form of "complete projects," and the living standard and working conditions of Chinese technical personnel sent to Vietnam. A protocol on Chinese delivery to the DRV of equipment and materials for "complete projects" was also concluded between the PRC Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries and the DRV Ministry of Foreign Trade. The same individuals, Li Chiang and Ly Ban, signed all the agreements.

There is no report this time of a protocol regarding Chinese technicians, but they continue to receive publicity in other propaganda. For example, aid personnel were reported as being present at activities during the visits to North Vietnam of Li Hsien-nien in September and Chou En-lai in March.

* See the TRENDS of 4 November 1970, pages 10-11.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA ARTICLE DISSECTS MAOISM, NOTES LIN PIAO'S FALL

Moscow has provided its most comprehensive analysis of the China problem since the recent Peking leadership reshuffle. A lengthy theoretical disquisition in PRAVDA on 5 December by leading academician P. Fedoseyev carries forward the Soviet ideological offensive against Peking's flexible policies by taking account of the purge of Lin Piao and other important figures in the Chinese military hierarchy. While taking a notably sanguine view of the prospects of anti-Maoist forces in China in the long term, the article's basic message is that the communist movement under Moscow's aegis must sustain its ideological attack designed to discredit the Maoist leadership and to check Peking's growing influence in world affairs.

The use of the theoretical approach in providing an account of the Chinese purge reflects the sensitivity of the subject, which Moscow has handled cautiously since tell-tale anomalies began appearing in the PRC. It is also in keeping with the use of quasischolarly methods for conducting Moscow's ideological campaign against the Chinese. On 1 December Moscow reported that a conference on Soviet Sinology ending that day had noted the "importance of the tasks of unmasking the anti-Marxist essence of Maoism." Previously, PRAVDA on 14 November announced that a new quarterly on "Problems of the Far East" would be started next year to deal with Soviet policy in that area.

The Fedoseyev article ends with the claim that "exposure of the anti-Leninist chauvinistic ideology and policy of Maoism is seen by genuine Marxist-Leninists as an indispensable condition" for strengthening communist unity. Citing the 24th CPSU Congress' line on Sino-Soviet relations, Fedoseyev observes that Moscow's effort to normalize state relations with the PRC "is also served by the ideological-political struggle against 'left' revisionism."

CRITIQUE OF PURE MAOISM	Fedoseyev's article, "On the Ideological-Political Essence of Maoism," pursues its task with an intransigence that consigns Mao beyond even the bounds of deviationism. It is impossible, according to Fedoseyev, to accommodate the Maoist interpretation
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of Marxism-Leninism within the framework of "a dogmatic-sectarian, 'leftist' interpretation." Worse than that, "Maoism is Sinicized social chauvinism of which Chinese social militarism constitutes the nucleus"--a charge contrived to turn back on Peking the type of labels it pins on the Soviets for practicing "social imperialism" and "social fascism."

Fedoseyev dismisses Maoist doctrine as an eclectic farrago of views, theories, and concepts in which great-power nationalism is the underlying motif. The use of whatever serves nationalistic and "great-Han chauvinist purposes" demonstrates "the narrowly utilitarian and pragmatic nature" of the theory and practice of Maoism, according to Fedoseyev's analysis. Though his argument is developed mainly on the theoretical plane, this line of analysis serves Moscow's purpose of discrediting the more flexible policies Peking has been pursuing, such as its invitation to President Nixon. Thus, in an allusion to this flexibility, Fedoseyev charges that the Maoists advance those tenets which serve their utilitarian needs at a given historical stage without concern for logic and continuity. In another passage, alluding to Peking's use of the theory of contradictions to justify new approaches to the United States as a means of isolating the Soviet Union as the main enemy, he claims that the Maoists posit relations of unity or struggle depending on whatever serves their great-power aims.

Fedoseyev does single out one issue, Indochina, in presenting his theoretical indictment. He charges that "Mao's group" hinders unity of action on Indochina, "in essence" pursuing "a policy of compromise with the imperialist forces on an anti-Soviet basis." He also complains that the Maoists are creating an atmosphere of war hysteria in China.

CHINESE PURGE The Fedoseyev article is notable for its account of the recent Chinese leadership upheaval, which may in fact be the occasion for this theoretical exercise. According to Fedoseyev, the role of a gendarmerie given to the People's Liberation Army in the cultural revolution led to ferment within the army and to disaffection toward Mao. The army thus became "a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist feelings," and for this reason "the Maoists at present are conducting purges" aimed at "mercilessly nipping in the very bud the anti-Maoist movement" in the PLA.

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In taking brief note of Lin Piao's disappearance--he "no longer figures as Mao's successor"--Fedoseyev recalls that the PLA had been prepared before the cultural revolution for the major role it was to play in that upheaval. It had been Lin, in fact, who was in charge of fashioning the army into an instrument serving Mao's political purposes. Fedoseyev explains that having completed the cultural revolution, in which the PLA played a decisive part, Mao then turned on the military leadership. "The meaning of this maneuver is obvious," Fedoseyev points out cryptically.

Fedoseyev's caution is characteristic of Moscow's reaction to the Chinese leadership reshuffle. Instead of coming to terms directly with the issues and implications, Moscow has had recourse to foreign comment for assessments of the significance of recent developments in China. Thus, LITERARY GAZETTE on 1 December carried excerpts from an Italian article on Lin Piao's disgrace which traces the conflict between Mao and Lin to questions involving foreign policy, mainly relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, resources allocated to the army, and the army's role in running the country.

"GENUINE" COMMUNISTS Fedoseyev's article concludes with a relatively confident portrayal of the strength of anti-Maoist forces in China and of the effects of pressure from the international communist movement. While acknowledging that Mao's "great-power chauvinist group" is maintaining its control in Peking, Fedoseyev claims that "powerful social, political, and sociological forces" within China and abroad are working to defend the country's socialist achievements and to restore Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The "genuine" communists in China have suffered a temporary reversal, Fedoseyev notes, "but they have not laid down their arms."

The invocation of the "genuine" communists opposing Maoism has been a recurrent theme in Moscow's ideological campaign for the past five years. It serves, among other things, to legitimize Moscow's effort to mobilize collective pressure within the communist movement against the anathematized Maoist faction. Thus, Fedoseyev claims that Moscow's "principled Leninist policy" and the international communist movement are influencing developments in China, citing in this connection the "condemnation of Maoism" at the June 1969 world party conference and at congresses of the fraternal parties. These pressures "cannot fail to take effect on the situation in China," he asserts.

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ANTI-CHINESE ATTACKS The current Polish party congress, which
AT POLISH CONGRESS opened a day after Fedoseyev's article,
 exemplifies his point about polemical
 pressure on the Chinese at such forums as party congresses.
Polish First Secretary Gierek's report on the opening day
included an indictment of Peking's "scissionist course." While
Brezhnev on the 7th ignored the Chinese, party chiefs of Moscow's
loyalist allies weighed in with attacks on Peking's policies.
However, there was no discussion of the recent leadership
developments in the PRC.

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CHINA

ARTICLE ON "PRAIRIE FIRE" LETTER SEEMS DIRECTED AT LIN

An article in RED FLAG No. 13, authored by the Yunnan Provincial CCP Committee, examines the "revolutionary truth" of one of Mao's most renowned works, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire." The title alone, all that is available so far, suffices to indicate that the current drive against "political swindlers" is being directed more explicitly against Lin Piao.

The piece by Mao, written in January 1930, was published in early collections of his works under the title, "Letter to Comrade Lin Piao." In the letter, Mao warned Lin against the danger of defeatism and instructed him that, although the outlook at the time appeared bleak, disunity among its enemies would result in victory for the CCP. The title was presumably altered in order to save Lin from embarrassment, and the editor of Mao's "Selected Works" notes simply that the piece "was a letter written by" Mao "in criticism of certain pessimistic views then existing in the party." The letter, somewhat avuncular in tone, was frequently cited during the cultural revolution, often--or so it seemed--as an implicit example of the longterm teacher-student relationship between Mao and Lin.

A recent broadcast by the Shensi provincial radio, referring to the "Prairie Fire" article, suggests that it is to be part of the indictment against Lin, evidence that his unreliability extends back some 40 years. The 27 November broadcast reported that a PLA company had read "Prairie Fire" in the course of a study of the history of the civil war. All members of the unit, it was said, noted that just as the revolution met with temporary difficulties "a number of opportunists in the party spread certain pessimistic ideas . . . in a vain attempt to weaken party morale and slow down the revolution." "Precisely at this moment," the broadcast observed, Mao countered the attack by writing "Prairie Fire."

"BOURGEOIS MILITARY LINE" PUSHED BY "SWINDLERS" IS ATTACKED

Some lessening of the PLA's direct control over local administrative work--possibly one of the issues involved in the struggle in which Lin Piao fell--is seen in recent press articles which stress the need for the army to pay more attention to improvement of military skills. Such a stress departs sharply from the norms of the

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cultural revolution, when propagandists singled out the PLA's role in revolution and production and appeared to assume that military affairs could take care of themselves. While complete withdrawal of the PLA from its civilian tasks is certainly not being suggested now, the injunctions to increase attention to military skills would seem to lead inevitably to a lowered attention to politics. Also, along with the calls for greater attention to military skills, there are indications that PLA influence on party committees and revolutionary committees is being eroded through injunctions to follow "unified leadership" rather than allow dominance by the (usually military) leading members of the committees.

Radio Peking on 3 December told how a PLA unit within the Shenyang Military Region had "correctly" handled the relationship between politics and military affairs. The report noted that while "politics must be put in command of military affairs . . . it cannot be substituted for military affairs." It was specifically argued that "giving prominence to politics does not mean that it is no longer necessary to solve many concrete problems in military training." Recalling the historical lesson to be learned from Lo Jui-ching's mistaken attempt to ignore politics and concentrate only on military development, the report declared that criticism of "the purely military viewpoint" is "not aimed at opposing military training." It was forcefully asserted that "the fallacy of totally separating military affairs from politics runs counter to Chairman Mao's line on army building."

The report then described in some detail how a gun captain within the unit who once "overemphasized politics without being realistic in target practice" had overcome this shortcoming and learned to handle correctly the relationship between politics and military affairs. After studying past attempts to "undermine Chairman Mao's line on army building from the extreme left," he "realized that to carry out ideological-political work without being realistic is also incompatible with Chairman Mao's line on army building." With this deepened understanding of the relationship between politics and military affairs, he was able to do a "good job in carrying out ideological-political work" and also in "arousing the enthusiasm of the comrades for mastering military skills."

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The same theme was utilized in a 22 November Hofei radio report on the ideological progress of members of the party committee of model PLA unit 6408--which is commanded by Li Te-sheng, Anhwei's first party secretary and an alternate politburo member, who has been making regular appearances in Peking in his post as chief of the General Political Department. While studying ways to strengthen his ability to "distinguish between genuine and sham Marxism," one of the party committee members discovered that because of the "bourgeois military line" promoted by Liu Shao-chi and "other political swindlers . . . some comrades were afraid to go all-out in grasping military affairs." After intensifying their study of works by Marx, Lenin and Mao, other members of the party committee were soon able to "see clearly the new form of struggle between the two different military lines under the new situation and to understand the unity between politics and military affairs." This understanding helped overcome the "erroneous idea of being afraid to grasp military affairs" and thus "set in motion military training and further stimulated political work."

A Chengtu press article on 16 November recalled that while "sham Marxist political swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" negated the commanding role of politics over military affairs from the right by advocating "big contests of arms" they also appeared later with "ultraleftist features and pursued empty politics divorced from reality, setting politics and military affairs against each other." The article urged emulation of the example of Lu Hsun, who discovered "in good time and mercilessly exposed sham Marxism of all hues," in order to obtain a "good grasp of genuine Marxism" to help in "seeing through and smashing" those enemies who "disguise themselves as Marxists."

The need to find the proper balance between military work and political studies was discussed in some detail in an article by a PLA unit in Harbin broadcast by the Heilungkiang provincial radio on 6 November. The article criticized those within the unit who learned military skills but neglected political studies as well as those who paid "great attention to political studies and maintained that military skills might be learned gradually later." It was firmly warned that if this went unchecked "military skills, no matter how good, could not serve their proper purposes and political studies would be divorced from reality."

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After conducting education on Mao's line on army building, members of this unit were able to criticize and struggle against the "bourgeois military line" pushed by Liu Shao-chi and "other political swindlers." It was claimed that deeper ideological work produced the realization that "substituting politics for military affairs, or divorcing military affairs from politics, is merely the reflection of the bourgeois military line." With this new understanding the commander of the unit was able to overcome his fear that "by grasping military training, he would be labeled as having purely military concepts," and he found it possible to "draw a clear line of demarcation between grasping training well for preparedness against war through putting politics in command, and grasping military training alone."

COLLECTIVE DECISIONS Those PLA leaders who hold leading positions on local revolutionary and party committees are now under specific instructions to strengthen their own party concept and to listen obediently to the collective decisions of committee members. This thesis was argued in some detail by Radio Peking on 3 December in a report on the activities of Chin Ko-min, a secretary of the Yutien county party committee in Hopei who is also head of the county's armed forces department. The report stated that because of Chin's efforts to carry out Mao's "revolutionary line while doing 'three supports and two militaries' tasks" during the cultural revolution "he was elected chairman of the county's revolutionary committee, and when the county's party committee was formed he was elected secretary of the committee." Immediately following the formation of the new party committee, however, veteran party members, "afraid they might make mistakes" in carrying out their work assignments, would do their work "only after getting the nod from Chin." Young cadres with poor concepts of the party's organization "came to Chin for consultations on the matters handled by them more often than they went to report the matters to the county's party committee."

Chin, aware of the need to be "modest and seek opinions" from others, held that as secretary of the party committee "he must place himself within the committee and not outside it, still less above it, so that the centralized leadership of the party would not be weakened." He also recalled that the fact that other committee members sought advice from him instead of participating in collective leadership "was an expression of their poor party concept."

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Chin attempted to correct these shortcomings by performing exemplary actions which manifested his own party spirit. On one occasion, for example, the standing committee had adopted a resolution presented by him on using the county's working capital to purchase production equipment for the county's industries. Some members of the party committee, however, opposed the resolution when the budget was submitted to the plenary session of the committee. Chin then "immediately withdrew the proposal"; another resolution "calling for self-reliance was adopted, and the production equipment was produced by the county itself."

PEKING POPULARIZES NEW TYPE OF NEIGHBORHOOD STORE

An innovation on the commercial front is indicated in a recent Radio Peking broadcast that tells of an experiment with small neighborhood stores in a district of Peking. The 5 December report explains that neighborhoods and factories are being allowed to buy goods from the state commercial department and sell them in neighborhood and factory canteens. It is said the system results not only in more convenient service to the people but in savings for the state as well. The broadcast article outlines the system in such detail that it appears to be offering the experimental stores as a national model.

The procedures for the neighborhood canteens include a number of safeguards to forestall any resurgence of smallscale capitalism. Nonetheless, the very existence of such stores, providing a buffer between the purchaser and the state, constitutes a retreat from the purer forms of communism.

The rationale for the stores is that the state commercial network has been unable to keep up with the needs of the district, whose population has rapidly increased; some found it necessary to walk a mile to buy basic necessities such as food, thread, and cigarettes. This was not only inconvenient, especially for people who worked during the hours stores were open, but there are also hints that it may have interfered with factory production, causing some factories to set up small shops on their own.

From this beginning, the decision was made to let factories and neighborhoods set up stores using their own personnel and equipment. The article notes that it was done over the objections of some workers in commerce.

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The report specifies that the stores should not be envisioned as a retreat to the cooperative store or to a practice of letting the neighborhoods run state commerce. Commercial departments will exercise business controls and are to make sure that the neighborhoods "adhere to the state unified price policy"; goods in the canteens are not to cost more than elsewhere. The neighborhoods will in theory only manage the canteens under state guidance, and will arrange for the commissions paid the store for selling goods to be correctly distributed among those working in the store. As a further safeguard, the stores are prohibited from selling any items not procured from the state, from bartering, or from credit transactions. They cannot even shop around for better state prices, but must buy at nearby state stores at retail prices.

Yet there is an incentive for the canteen employees to sell more goods, an incentive not offered state employees. Commissions paid to the store (and thus to the employees) increase as the volume grows; furthermore, the article specifies that the percentage of commission paid will vary with the volume of sales.

The new system of neighborhood canteens offers several clear economic advantages to the state, and loopholes which would allow bourgeois deviations are at least legally closed. The state saves the capital expense of building large stores, and it saves on salaries paid from government funds; it wins popular favor, and it probably sells more goods, not only because the stores are more convenient but because the salespeople have an incentive to sell more.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

PACT COMMUNIQUE, SOVIET LEADERS PRESS CONFERENCE PROPOSAL

Soviet bloc pressures for the convening of a European security conference were sustained with the release on 2 December of the communique on the meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Warsaw. The communique on the 30 November-1 December meeting--like the communique on the last Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' meeting in Bucharest in February--endorses the November 1970 Finnish proposal for the opening of multilateral preparatory consultations among all states concerned and announces that the Pact governments have decided to appoint plenipotentiaries to take part in preparatory meetings. The communique says that such meetings should consider, among other things, the agenda of an all-European conference.

Listing the steps contributing to an easing of tension in Europe, the communique cites the four-power accord on Berlin and the "deepening of political cooperation" between the USSR and France. Additionally, it points to 1972 as the year in which the convening of a conference is possible, a line that has appeared frequently in propaganda since Brezhnev's October visit to France. Both Brezhnev in Warsaw, in his 7 December speech at the Polish party congress, and Kosygin during his visits to Denmark and Norway have raised the possibility of holding the conference next year. Speaking in Copenhagen on the 3d, Kosygin said a conference could be held in 1972 "if no obstacles are raised artificially"; in the same speech, he cited the 2 December Pact communique on readiness to appoint plenipotentiaries to take part in preparatory meetings.

The communique appeals to the governments of all European states, as well as to those of the United States and Canada, to begin preparations for a conference in order to insure its convocation in 1972. While the February communique did not name the United States and Canada, the memorandum following a Pact foreign ministers' meeting in June 1970 had formalized the bid to both countries, and subsequent propaganda has regularly included Washington and Ottawa among the likely participants.

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KOSYGIN HINTS TROOP REDUCTION COULD BE ON CONFERENCE AGENDA

The 2 December Pact communique failed to mention the Brezhnev proposal--surfaced in his 31 March 1971 report to the CPSU Congress--for the opening of talks on force and armaments reductions in central Europe. But Kosygin in his 3 December speech in Copenhagen intimated that the force-reduction proposal might be discussed at a European security conference. As reported by TASS, he noted Soviet interest in seeing the governments of all European states exerting their efforts at ensuring lasting security in Europe, "at reductions of armed forces and armaments," at disarmament, and at pursuing a policy of peace; he concluded that it is "particularly these questions" that the USSR and its allies hope to solve at a European security conference. AFP cited Kosygin as telling newsmen in Oslo on the 7th that if the European security conference were held soon, "problems surrounding the mutual and balanced force reduction question could be incorporated into the meeting."* The TASS account of this press conference, while noting Kosygin's endorsement of a European security conference, did not broach the force-reduction issue.

Brezhnev in Warsaw mentioned the force-reduction proposal only in passing, observing that a radical improvement in the political climate in Europe and a solution of "all-European problems, including a cut in armed forces and armaments, would correspond to the interests of all mankind."

Both the 5 December Soviet-Danish and 7 December Soviet-Norwegian communiqués note the importance of achieving practical results on the problem of mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe "where the military confrontation is particularly dangerous," adding that reductions must be made without detriment to the interests of participating states. This formulation, which first

* The memorandum of the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of Pact foreign ministers in Budapest had proposed that a European security conference discuss as an agenda item "the establishment of a body concerned with questions of European security and cooperation." It added that in the Pact members' view, it would help to promote security in Europe if the reduction of "foreign" armed forces on the territory of European states were discussed, either in the newly proposed permanent body "or in other ways acceptable to the states concerned."

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appeared in the 18 September 1971 communique following Chancellor Brandt's meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea, has since been widely repeated in routine Soviet propaganda and in subsequent communiques with NATO members. (The 30 October Soviet-French declaration, however, did not treat the problem of force reductions.)

While Soviet propaganda in early October had acknowledged that former NATO Secretary-General Brosio had been selected as the alliance's emissary to discuss force cuts in Moscow, subsequent propaganda not unexpectedly has remained silent on his unsuccessful efforts to meet with Soviet representatives on this question.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GDR BLAMES WEST FOR DELAY IN SIGNING OF INNER-GERMAN ACCORDS

The East Berlin press, radio, television, and ADN launched a bitter propaganda barrage on 4 December accusing the West in general and the West Berlin Senat and Governing Mayor Schuetz in particular of "torpedoing" plans for ceremonies that day to initial draft accords worked out in the inner-German phase of negotiations following the 3 September Big Four agreement on Berlin. Noting that the negotiations between FRG and GDR State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl on an East-West German transit agreement were "successfully" completed on the 3d, East Berlin media have professed "incredulity" over FRG willingness to permit a linkage between the Bahr-Kohl talks and the stalled negotiations between Senat representative Mueller and GDR State Secretary Kohrt on travel and visits by West Berliners to the GDR and on the question of enclaves.

East Berlin's comment has been at pains to underscore the GDR's "accommodating attitude" in both sets of talks, against the background of evident Soviet pressures for their conclusion in November--prior to the 9-10 December NATO Council session, in light of NATO's position that the Berlin problem should be solved before the West can move ahead to consideration of a conference on European security and cooperation.

Buttressing the insistent portrayal of GDR good will and anxiety for completion of the inner-German phase, East Berlin media disclosed on the 4th that the GDR had offered a "special concession" if the agreements had been initialed that day. According to NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 5th, West Berliners would have been able to visit East Berlin and "other areas of the GDR" during the coming Christmas holidays for the first time since 1966. Other GDR media emphasized that this would have been allowed even if the final protocol putting the Berlin agreement into effect had not yet been signed by the Big Four. (Chancellor Brandt confirmed the GDR's Christmas-visits offer on the 8th.)

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND declared on the 6th that the GDR was still "prepared to initial the agreements without delay." Ignoring the Senat's call for further discussion on remaining differences in the Mueller-Kohrt talks, ADN reported on the 7th that State Secretary Peter Florin would replace Kohrt--who had "fallen ill and has to undergo hospital treatment"--to conduct talks with the Senat "for the final preparation of the initialing of the

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agreements." ADN reported the upshot of the Florin-Kohrt meeting, which materialized in the early hours of 8 December, in an announcement later that day that "the talks showed again that there is complete agreement between the two sides" on the two agreements under negotiation but that the Senat representative "again was not ready or authorized to initial these documents." Ignoring the West German charges made public earlier in the day that the GDR Government had repudiated its own representative's tentative agreement to a resolution of the remaining differences, ADN claimed that the Senat representative "raised further unacceptable demands which he wanted inserted in minutes already agreed on." The ADN report concluded with the stock assurance that the East German side affirmed its readiness to sign both agreements "without delay."

NOVEMBER DEADLINE The mounting Soviet pressures on the East Germans to wind up the negotiations had come sharply into focus in East German and Soviet media during Brezhnev's brief stopover in East Berlin on 31 October-1 November en route home from France. Although both he and Honecker referred in luncheon speeches to "full unanimity" of views, the joint communique on the visit included no such formula. It did state that Honecker informed Brezhnev about the "progress" of the inner-German talks and that Brezhnev "expressed support for the businesslike and constructive position" of the GDR and for GDR "efforts directed at the quickest possible conclusion" of the talks--something less than unqualified Soviet approbation. Honecker had said in his luncheon speech that the GDR was doing everything possible to reach a "positive conclusion" as soon as possible.

Four days later, in a speech at a reception marking the October Revolution anniversary, Honecker specified that the GDR was "interested in concluding the negotiations . . . in November if possible." And the GDR's "interest" in a November conclusion was reiterated by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Chief Editor Herrmann in an article in PRAVDA on 16 November, as well as by Foreign Minister Winzer in a speech at a diplomatic dinner in East Berlin on the 17th. The intensity of the Soviet pressures behind these avowals was brought into sharp relief the next day when PRAVDA political commentator Zhukov misquoted Honecker. According to Zhukov, Honecker's statement that "the current talks among the GDR, the FRG, and the West Berlin Senat can and must be successfully concluded this November still further intensified hopes for the constructive development of events in Europe."

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On the 19th, the East Germans further escalated their assurances that they were making all-out efforts to conclude the talks, while attempting to shift the onus for the delays to the West. The SED Politburo report to the Central Committee plenum that day stated that the GDR has "repeatedly stressed" that it was "ready to make concessions" in the talks in the interests of European peace and security, adding that the FRG and the Senat must be "equally willing to show realism" if the talks were to succeed.

As the momentum increased in the inner-German talks in the latter half of November, Winzer stated in a Dresden speech on the 25th that the GDR was "showing an accommodation to achieve an understanding" in the talks with the FRG within the limits of the GDR's sovereign rights. The CPSU Central Committee plenum resolution on the party's international activity, released by TASS on 23 November, glaringly omitted any reference to the Berlin agreement in listing European developments. However, the "West Berlin" agreement was duly cited as one of the "milestones" leading to an improved European political situation in the 2 December communique of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' meeting. The communique also said that the ministers expressed "satisfaction" at the GDR stand contributing to a "successful course" in the talks. The 30 November communique on FRG Foreign Minister Scheel's visit to the USSR and the communiques on Kosygin's visits to Denmark and Norway, issued on 5 and 7 December respectively, routinely expressed hope that the talks would be concluded shortly.

With the November deadline imminent, the GDR Government's programmatic statement read by Premier Stoph on the 29th again conveyed the sense of urgency about winding up the talks. Noting that the talks "recently advanced a good deal," Stoph said "it is necessary and possible to conclude them soon; this requires that all parties proceed constructively to solve related questions."

In his speech to the Polish party congress on 7 December, Brezhnev limited his remarks on the subject to the statement that the "working out of an agreement between the GDR and the FRG and the West Berlin Senat on questions relating to" West Berlin, along with the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, GDR and FRG membership in the United Nations, and a settlement of problems between Prague and Bonn, "will bring the postwar period of European development to an end." Brezhnev left it to Polish leader Gierek to state that ratification of the

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Moscow and Warsaw treaties "will also facilitate the effective implementation of the important agreement of the four powers on West Berlin"; at the elite level, Moscow has scrupulously avoided suggesting this "reverse linkage," the notion that the treaties must be ratified before the final Berlin protocol can be signed, turning around Bonn's insistence that signing of the protocol is a precondition for ratification.

COMMENTARIES RELEASE DETAILS OF SENAT-GDR AGREEMENTS

The SED Politburo announced on the evening of 3 December that it "fully and entirely" approved reports by Kohl and Kohrt "on the conclusion" of their respective negotiations and recommended to the GDR Council of Ministers that both be authorized to initial the respective agreements. Referring on the 4th to the "successfully" concluded Bahr-Kohl agreement, the media divulged no details. But details on two prospective Senat-GDR accords, still held up in the Mueller-Kohrt negotiations, were made public for the first time in GDR media in the course of the concerted propaganda assault on West Berlin Mayor Schuetz for allegedly undermining plans to get all the agreements initialed that day.

ADN on the 4th for the first time reported the titles of the two prospective Senat-GDR agreements--on "Alleviations and Improvements in Travel and Visits" and "The Settlement of the Question of Enclaves by Territorial Exchanges." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day discussed in detail the visit and travel provisions of the first agreement, without acknowledging the two outstanding Senat demands that visits be allowed 365 days a year on demand and that they be made by private car if desired. On the 6th the paper took note of these demands and rejected them.

Rebutting Schuetz' statement to the effect that he considered the Mueller-Kohrt agreements "unacceptable," the SED paper on the 5th revealed the following allegedly agreed provisions of the travel accord, with a prefatory "as we have learned": West Berliners could receive permission to visit once or several times a year, for an annual total of 30 days, "the GDR capital" and all of the GDR for purposes based on "humanitarian, family, religious, cultural, and tourist grounds." A personal identification document and GDR entry and exit permits would be required, and the latter two could be obtained on application to the authorized bodies. West Berliners, the paper said, could receive entry permits at the border crossing points but must produce vouchers or telegrams confirmed by

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competent GDR organs. Thus the GDR version contained no procedure for possible immediate entry on demand, which Schuetz in a statement on the 6th had maintained should flow from the four-power agreement's stipulation that West Berliners should be allowed to travel to East Berlin on the same basis as West Germans.

The next day, in coming directly to grips with Schuetz' "absurd" demands "that West Berliners be guaranteed entry permission--by car--on all 365 days on the year," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND argued that there is not "a single word" about 365 days or about "promised entry by car" in the four-power agreement. Maintaining that the GDR as a "sovereign state" decides the mode of entry into its territory, "in what way, for how long, and how often," the paper remarked caustically that for a stay of 30 days West Berliners can use the railroads, aircraft, subways, streetcars, taxis, and other means of transport--"they should suffice to get West Berliners into the GDR."

Regarding the agreement on enclaves, the paper specified on the 5th that West Berlin would receive "a link, belonging to West Berlin, between Steinstuecken and West Berlin" and that an exchange of other parcels of territory between West Berlin and the GDR was to take place.

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POLISH CONGRESS

IMPACT OF DECEMBER EVENTS PERVADES OPENING SPEECHES

Following First Secretary Gierek's opening report to the Sixth Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) Congress on 6 December, which spelled out an elaborate program to remedy the "bitter" experiences of December 1970, Brezhnev the next day endorsed Gierek's corrective efforts and conveyed a veiled warning that orthodox principles must continue to be observed. The 70 foreign party delegations to the congress include all the Warsaw Pact country first secretaries--including Romania's Ceausescu, who had sent lower-ranking figures to the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German party congresses this year after attending the CPSU congress in April. Attendance at the congress of the softer-lining Polish party provides Ceausescu with a convenient means to counteract the impression of Romania's growing isolation within the Warsaw Pact.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Attending his fourth East European party congress this year, Brezhnev used language reminiscent of his remarks at the May CPCZ congress, with reference to the Czechoslovak 1968 events, when he invoked "historical experience" in noting that "individual omissions and mistakes, sometimes serious ones, are not ruled out in the great work of socialist construction." He added: "But what is important is that they stem not from the nature of socialism as a social system" and its basic principles but occur "when there is some departure from these principles, some violation of them." In this connection, the Soviet leader warned that "we communists are answerable for the destinies of our country, for a correct course of socialist development."

Brezhnev registered generally low-keyed approval of the Gierek regime's reform measures, which are mainly concerned with a greater voice for the workers in party decision-making and a better lot for the consumer: "We respect the principled and courageous approach of the Polish United Workers Party to correcting negative developments that have taken place." He noted further "a great and sincere concern for the interests of the working people, for a constant strengthening of the ties with the working masses, concern which is displayed by your party and its Central Committee led by the true son of the Polish working class, our friend and comrade Edward Gierek."

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The Soviet leader's tribute to Gierek fell somewhat short of his accolades for Kadar, Zhivkov, and Honecker at their respective party congresses. In Budapest in November 1970, he hailed "that true son of the Hungarian people and outstanding and respected figure in the international communist and workers movement, Comrade Janos Kadar." In Sofia in April 1971, he praised "the eminent leader of the international communist movement, our great friend, Comrade Todor Zhivkov." And in East Berlin in June, he said "our respected friend and comrade Erich Honecker, a steadfast antifascist, an outstanding organizer of the party and state construction of the republic, enjoys the great confidence of communists and of all working people of the GDR." In May at the Prague congress Brezhnev avoided a personal tribute to Husak, praising instead the CPCZ and "its leaders, Comrade Gustav Husak, Ludvik Svoboda, and others" and voicing thanks for the praise of the CPSU by "Comrade Gustav Husak and other comrades who have spoken here."

Brezhnev stopped short of reiterating the limited-sovereignty concept that he had spelled out at the Polish party congress in November 1968, but he reminded the Poles that their "irrevocable" entry onto the path of socialism and into the "unified family of socialist countries" meant that their "freedom and independence are guaranteed once and for all and without conditions." He prefaced this statement with a reference to the protection Poland enjoys by virtue of its membership in the Warsaw Pact.

GIEREK REPORT The PZPR leader balanced his denunciation of the negative legacy of Gomulka's leadership with praise for the fallen leader in a historical context. He recalled that "great services were rendered to the party in the final stage of the struggle against the Nazi invader and in the first years of the people's power by Wladyslaw Gomulka," praising also the early "contribution" by the purged Stalinist Bierut.

In preparing the present congress, Gierek declared, the PZPR "bore in mind the bitter and painful experience of the social conflict which our country went through one year ago." He went on to recall that the seventh and eighth plenums of the PZPR, in December and February, respectively, had "formulated a correct and exhaustive evaluation of the essence and causes of the December events." He added: "Our party has drawn the indispensable lessons and conclusions from the December events."

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Without making any new direct attack on Gomulka's leadership, to judge from PAP's summary of the report, Gierek said "the errors in policy and deformations in the methods of management" which his regime had to overcome "arose first of all from the infringement of the general Leninist norms of the construction of socialism." Further underscoring the orthodoxy of the present Polish course, he said his regime had "restored the Leninist principles, overcome serious difficulties, carried out a great work, and led the country onto the correct road." And he asserted Poland's "deep gratitude" to the fraternal parties, "particularly to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for having understood the essence of the difficulties we encountered."

Gierek insisted that the Polish socialist state "under the existing conditions fulfils the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and declared that in party cadre policy and in "inner-party democracy," the observance of "Leninist teachings is the basic guarantee that socialist development will be continued correctly, without important errors and tremors." Again underscoring fealty to the USSR, he stated that Poland's international policy has as its "cornerstone" fraternal relations with the Soviet Union.

The PZPR leader's commitment to improve conditions for the populace was underscored by his preoccupation, during the bulk of the speech, with prospects in the 1971-75 plan for such features as increased consumer goods production, higher real wages, larger old-age and disability pensions, better housing, and increased agricultural production--still 85 percent in the private sector in Poland, in contrast to generally complete collectivization in the other East European Warsaw Pact countries. "The whole nation," Gierek declared, "wants a more affluent and better life," and "we have no right to frustrate those hopes and expectations."

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YUGOSLAVIA

TITO REBUKES CROATIAN LEADERS, CALLS FOR PARTY CRACKDOWN

President Tito used his keynote speech at the 21st League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Presidium meeting on 1-2 December in Karadordevo, Vojvodina, to denounce supporters of the Zagreb student strike and to make his harshest public attack to date on the Croatian party leadership. Characterizing the strike--which began on 23 November as a protest against the foreign exchange system--as "a counterrevolutionary" act, he criticized the Croatian leaders for failing to take action to prevent it and for tolerating the existence of counterrevolutionary groups and activities in the republic. In an evident effort to muster public support, particularly among the workers, for Tito's hard-line attitude toward the students and nationalist elements, the Yugoslav press gave the speech frontpage publicity and followed up with reports of widespread approval for it.

In a windup speech the next day, however, Tito pulled back to a more conciliatory stance; and the Presidium's formal conclusions, while expressing "full support" for the assessment offered in Tito's keynote speech, made no reference to "counterrevolutionary" activity in Croatia and expressed confidence in the Croatian party leaders' ability to cope with their own "difficulties." The Presidium's decision to adjourn the two-day meeting without taking action and to let the Croats put their own house in order seems to reflect the reluctance of the major republican party leaders to set a precedent that might later be used against them. It also points up the erosion of the federal party's authority in the wake of the decentralization process that has given unprecedented power to republican party leaders.

Apparently capitulating to Tito's warning and to other pressures to end their walkout, the Zagreb students decided to return to class at a rally on the 3d. But the Radio Belgrade account of the rally reported that the student leaders--in rebuttal to Tito's assessment of the strike--insisted that it was not motivated by nationalism or chauvinism and "was not organized in conjunction with forces outside the country."

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TITO SPEECHES In his introductory speech to the Presidium on 1 December, Tito revealed that he had met with the Croatian party leadership the day before and had accused them of not having taken effective measures to prevent the student strike. It was not just students who were responsible for the strike, Tito said, but also "negative elements whose trail clearly leads abroad" --an evident allusion to Croatian emigre groups.

Accusing the Croatian leaders of "passivity" in the face of these "counterrevolutionary" activities, Tito angrily asserted that any attempt to make "excuses" for such activities would amount to "a lack of vigilance, complacency, and rotten liberalism toward such elements." More specifically, he went on to charge that the Croatian leadership was in effect tolerating the existence of "counterrevolutionary groups" where it should be taking "the sharpest action" against them. In this context he mentioned the nationalistic cultural organization Matica Hrvatska and assailed the Zagreb daily VJESNIK for publishing "anticonstitutional" statements. He also singled out anti-self-management activities of "the revolutionary committee of 50" as "counterrevolutionary."

Noting in a broader context that the LCY is being "reorganized," Tito repeated the familiar theme that the party has many members who should have been removed, and he recommended--as in the past, without naming them--that such people be expelled as soon as possible and that all "counterrevolutionary organizations" be dissolved.

In his concluding speech to the Presidium on the 2d, Tito renewed his call for firm action against nationalist elements and "counter-revolutionary tendencies," but this time he assumed a generally more defensive posture and a more conciliatory stance toward the Croatian leadership. Maintaining that he was not calling for a return to the past and the launching of "a campaign," he expressed concern about what might happen in the future if present trends toward ideological erosion, particularly among the youth, continue. In an effort to spread the blame for present developments more broadly and to explain why he had singled out the Croatian party, he observed that it is not only the Croatian leaders who are responsible for recent developments. Strikes, he said, have occurred in other republics, and "what happened in Croatia is the most drastic example."

Leaving it to the present Croatian leaders to put their house in order, at least for the present, Tito stated that the reply to the strike can "primarily" be given by the Croatian party leaders

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themselves. He acknowledged that his call for taking "administrative" measures against dissident elements had met with some opposition in the Presidium debate, declaring that those who object to his proposed actions as "undemocratic" and "cannot bear such action against counterrevolutionaries should get out of the League of Communists."

LCY CONCLUSIONS The LCY Presidium conclusions publicized on 2 December, as reported by TANYUG, express support for Tito's attack on nationalism and chauvinism but take a far more positive attitude toward the Croatian party's ability to solve its own problems and a more conciliatory tack toward the students. The Presidium expresses complete confidence in the ability of the League of Communists of Croatia and its Central Committee to overcome "existing difficulties, vacillation, and certain deviations with regard to ideological and political actions against nationalism of various colors and political tendencies taking cover under the guise of nationalism."

The conclusions emphasize that it is the full responsibility of all Yugoslav communists, but primarily of republican and provincial Central Committees, "to undertake, each in its own environment, resolute ideological-political action against antisocialist trends." They also stress that it is the responsibility of all communists in positions of authority to apply constitutional regulations without hesitation and to undertake "legal" measures against all individuals and groups which oppose the Yugoslav self-management system. In a conciliatory gesture toward the students, the Presidium calls on republican central committees to create more favorable conditions for the functioning of democratic institutions and for efforts to overcome delays in solving economic problems.

Avoiding any reference to "counterrevolutionary" activities or trends in Croatia, the TANYUG version of the document also fails to repeat Tito's charge that the strike was instigated from abroad.

SOVIET REPORT The 4 December PRAVDA carried a TASS report on Tito's 1 December address to the LCY Presidium, including his statement that counterrevolutionary groups and individuals are active in Croatia. The account also singled out his statement that the most dangerous class enemies are chauvinism and nationalism. Treating the LCY Presidium's conclusions very selectively, PRAVDA noted in one sentence that "the Presidium fully supports the assessments and position of Comrade Tito and adopts his speech as a component part of its decision."

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CROATIAN MEETING As reported by TANJUG on the 6th, the Croatian party executive committee met that day and issued a statement with mild overtones of self-criticism, vowing that the Croatian party and people are resolved "to remove shortcomings and to solve problems that have arisen in keeping with the policy of the LCY and the League of Communists of Croatia."

Reporting to a party aktiv on the 7th, Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, a LCY Executive Bureau member and leading Croatian party official, informed his audience that Tito's criticism of nationalistic manifestations in Croatia was "nothing new," but "it happened . . . that he had to tell us publicly that he did not agree with us." TANJUG quoted Bakaric as remarking that it would "not be easy" to implement Tito's proposals.

REPUBLIC PARTY LEADERS DIFFER ON FEDERAL PARTY'S ROLE

Differing views on how to deal with nationalist manifestations in the republics and on the role of the federal party were reflected clearly in comment at the republican level following the two-day LCY Presidium session. At a party aktiv meeting in Novi Sad on the 6th, praise for the "clear and sharp" approach in Tito's 1 December Presidium speech came from Mirko Canadanovich, head of the provincial committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina, whom Tito had quoted approvingly in his second speech to the Presidium. But Canadanovich remarked that the debate on the problem of nationalism had not been sufficiently "concrete." As quoted by TANJUG, he noted that "the Presidium did not denounce anyone, nor did it endorse anyone's responsibility or further political work." Defending his concurrence in the Presidium decision to let the Croats handle their own problems, he maintained that any other course would have been "incompatible with our socialist relations" and would have played into the hands of Croat nationalists, who would have used any federal action as evidence that Croatia is not independent and that its policy is "in foreign hands."

A more hardline approach to the federal party's role was taken by Bosnia-Herzegovina Executive Committee member Hasan Grabcanovic in an address to a local party conference on the 6th. While granting that the principle that everyone should keep his own house in order is a good one, he added that "republics are not isolated islands, and it has been demonstrated that often we must keep our common house in order with joint forces."

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In sharp contrast, the powerful Serbian party chief Marko Nikezic was quoted by TANJUG as making a strong pitch for republican party autonomy in a speech to a group of local communists on the same day. Nikezic stated that "nationalism in Croatia and anywhere in Yugoslavia could only be beaten along democratic lines, not the line of bureaucratic centralism or conservatism or by a return to the earlier relations." He added: "Nobody can construct socialism in Croatia but the working class and communists of Croatia."

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SAYS ISRAEL, U.S. OBSTRUCT PEACE SOUGHT BY ARABS

Moscow comment pegged to the UNGA debate on the Middle East and Israeli Prime Minister Meir's 2 December meeting with President Nixon in Washington hews to the established line that the Arabs are seeking peace while Israel and its American supporters are thwarting these efforts. Soviet commentators reiterate that Egypt's "initiative" in requesting the UNGA debate demonstrates its concern for a political settlement, while Mrs. Meir's U.S. visit illustrates Israel's focus on American military deliveries.

Typifying the low-volume propaganda on the UNGA discussion and the Meir visit, a domestic service commentary on the 6th by former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Belyayev concluded that Israel has "stubbornly ignored" all UN and Arab efforts for a political settlement due to the support it has received from the United States. Belyayev routinely charged that the United States, while verbally advocating peace and talking about mediation to reach a settlement, simultaneously supplies Israel with "modern offensive armaments." He observed that Mrs. Meir "reached agreement" with the President "providing for Israel's long-term requirements for modernizing and maintaining the level of its armed forces." Washington, he said, justifies such actions by the theory of balance of power, which means military superiority over the Arab forces. Belyayev asserted that the United States, by its "ambiguous actions," is delaying a just settlement and also concealing its efforts to realize its own ambitions in the Middle East.

Moscow continues to portray Israel as threatening Egypt with a new war. Koryavin maintained in the 2 December IZVESTIYA that Tel Aviv intends to continue basing its policy on a military solution. Touching on the possibility of further fighting, a commentary in Arabic on the 3d laid the blame for current tension on Israel's stubbornness which "may have a tragic result--the resumption of military operations." Warily broaching Egyptian President as-Sadat's "request that 1971 be a decisive year," a formula Moscow only belatedly and cautiously acknowledged, the broadcast called this "a natural answer" to the Israeli attitude. It rejected the U.S. and Israeli "noisy propaganda campaign" to present as-Sadat's position as the cause of the present tension.

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UNGA DEBATE Reporting Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad's 3 December speech on the opening day of the UNGA Mideast discussion, TASS on the 4th noted that he called, in conclusion, for the application against Israel of "coercive measures provided for by the UN Charter." A Soltan radio commentary on the 4th referred to the possibility of the application of sanctions in concluding that there are many opportunities open to the United Nations, "including the use of sanctions," and that the time has come to make use of them.

Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's speech on 6 December was briefly reported by TASS, which described it as another confirmation of "the Israeli extremists' aggressive aspirations." TASS said Eban declared Israel would make no pledges "beforehand" as to withdrawal from the occupied territories and that he cast doubt on the importance of Resolution 242.

An unusual Soviet reference to differing interpretations of the November 1967 resolution appeared in an article by PRAVDA's Demchenko in the monthly 20TH CENTURY AND PEACE, reviewed by TASS on the 3d. Asking rhetorically if the prolongation of the crisis could be ascribed to "a different interpretation" of the resolution, Demchenko acknowledged that "no doubt the resolution was the outcome of a compromise, and its paragraphs can be interpreted in various ways." But it is still the recognized formula which can restore justice and peace in the area, he said, and it must be implemented without delay "before the situation boils up again."

SOVIET LEADERS Brezhnev, addressing the Polish party congress on 7 December, merely reiterated that the socialist countries are doing everything to "upset the plans of the Israeli predators and their patrons" and to help the Arabs "defend their lawful rights" and promote the establishment of a just peace. In a speech on the 7th at a banquet for the visiting Yemeni leaders, Podgornyy voiced standard Soviet support for the Arab struggle and expressed confidence that the Arabs' efforts for a political settlement would be successful. Podgornyy also reiterated charges, last made in October, of "imperialist and Zionist" efforts to split the "national patriotic forces" in the Arab countries, stressing that such intrigues should not

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disturb the Arabs if they join efforts in their common struggle, if "the interests of each agree with the interests of all," and if "sincere willingness" to strengthen unity is shown.*

Moscow radio announced on the 7th that Defense Minister Grechko would be paying an "official friendly visit" to Iraq, Syria, and Somalia--no mention of Egypt--in the second half of December. The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY had reported in mid-May that Grechko had accepted an invitation from his Iraqi counterpart to visit Iraq toward the end of the year.

* The importance of Arab unity and warnings of "imperialist" efforts to disunite the Arabs and disrupt their friendship with the USSR were pressed by Soviet leaders and in Moscow propaganda in October, during Kosygin's Algerian and Moroccan visits and the visits of the PDRY prime minister and Egyptian President as-Sadat to Moscow. Emphasis on these themes had diminished since as-Sadat's visit.

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